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Technological diversification can overcome the limitations imposed by an enterprise’s 
single technological capability and enables enterprises to recombine resources, thereby 
enhancing their competitive advantage. In-house inventor cooperation can improve the 
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efficiency of the production factor combination and expand the scope of the enterprise’s 
technology base. This study empirically explores the effect of in-house inventor 
cooperation network on technology diversification. In addition, this study further 
investigates the moderating effect of intellectual property protection on the inventor 
cooperation network and on corporate technology diversification. An enterprise 
inventor cooperation network is embodied by its network location characteristics. 
Empirical results show that the difference in the location of the inventor cooperative 
network exhibits different effects on the diversification of enterprise technology. 
Moreover, intellectual property protection significantly weakens the incentive effect of 
the intermediary location of inventor cooperative network on corporate technology 
diversification. 
Keywords: Inventor Cooperation Network, Corporate Technology Diversification, 




Corporate technology diversification refers to the process of continuously expanding 
the scope of a company’s technology foundation and forming new technological 
capabilities on the basis of maintaining and upgrading relevant core technologies 
(Cantwell and Vertova, 2004). Corporate technology diversification can improve 
corporate performance(Gemba and Kodama, 2001), promote corporate technological 
innovation (Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998), and enhance the competitive advantage of 
enterprises (Suzuki and Kodama, 2004). In a dynamic and volatile market competition 
environment, technology diversification requires enterprises to overcome the 
limitations of single technical capabilities and broaden the scope of their internal 
technology. Furthermore, this concept helps enterprises create and maintain 
competitive advantage. 
In general, companies can obtain the necessary technical capabilities from the 
market. To keep up with the current technological frontier, firms in developing 
countries have been striving to promote technological advancement through exerting 
 
 
internal research and development efforts (in-house R&D) and external technology 
purchasing. Hou and Mohnen (2013)pointed that several signs of complementarity are 
evident between the two sources. However, this complementarity is merely viable to 
companies with 100– 300 employees. Surprisingly, firms that do both do not necessarily 
achieve the highest productivity performance. However, studies have shown that 
knowledge on new technologies is mainly produced through internal research 
(Granstrand et al., 1997). That is, the internal characteristics of an enterprise affect its 
corporate technology diversification. For example, changes in one component of a 
product frequently require the adoption of other components or redesign of the system 
architecture (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Companies’ accumulation of technical 
knowledge is the main path through which most companies diversify their technology 
(Torrisi et al., 2004), but it also poses challenges for companies. In the process of 
technological diversification, enterprises should focus on the challenge of how to 
effectively coordinate the relationships among various departments and promote 
synergy between the internal and external technologies of different products (Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1997).  
Therefore, when companies diversify their technology base, they must allocate 
resources and share the required resources to maintain the diversity of their technology 
portfolios (Garcia-Vega, 2006b). As one of the most important means through which 
enterprises improve the efficiency of internal production factor combination (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1997), inventor cooperation should be given further attention. The 
interweaving of many inventor cooperative relations forms the inventor cooperative 
network. Numerous studies that focus on the measurement of cooperative patents (Chen 
et al., 2011), the evolution of inventor cooperative networks (Takagi et al., 2009), and 
inventor collaboration network and innovation performance (Graf et al., 2011) have 
discussed the importance of inventor cooperation networks. Overall, current research 
on inventor collaboration networks mainly focuses on team structure, team 
characteristics, and leadership styles, among other factors (Earley and Mosakowski, 
2000). However, few studies have addressed the impact of corporate in-house inventor 
cooperation networks on corporate technology diversification.  
 
 
On this basis, this study further explores the boundary conditions of the inventor 
cooperative network that relates to the diversification of technology. We examine the 
moderating effects of intellectual property protection on the inventor's network and on 
technology diversification. This procedure is conducted because intellectual property is 
a tool for optimizing resource allocation (Arrow et al., 1962) that affects the process of 
acquiring resources (Sun et al., 2016). The relationship between intellectual property 
and innovation has been discussed for many years(Allred and Park, 2007; Saxena and 
Sharma, 2012) because the impact of intellectual property on innovation activities is 
complex(Long and Wang, 2018). The idea is now supported by more researchers that 
optimal intellectual property protection  is stage-dependent (Chu et al., 2014). As to 
different types of countries, studies have shown that the impact of intellectual property 
protection varies greatly. For example, although IPRs policy limits domestic innovation 
in developing countries, it encourages domestic innovation in developed countries(Kim 
et al., 2012, Sweet and Maggio, 2015). Furthermore, others suggest that IPR contributes 
to domestic innovation for developed countries while  the results are not as compelling 
for developing countries (Panda and Sharma, 2019). 
. The levels of intellectual property protection are discrepant in different parts of 
China (Hasan et al., 2009). Does this difference affect the relationship between inventor 
cooperative network and diversification of corporate technology? For companies in 
different regions of China, do stringent intellectual property protection policies affect 
the relationship between corporate inventor cooperation networks and technological 
diversification?  
This study empirically explores the impact of in-house inventor cooperation 
network on technology diversification for 87 listed large-scale manufacturing 
companies using corporate patents and financial data from 2011 to 2015. The results 
have enriched the research on technology diversification. Most previous literature has 
discussed the influence of technology diversification, but this paper empirically tests 
the factors affecting technology diversification. As a moderating variable, the increase 
of intellectual property protection verifies that the strengthening of intellectual property 
protection may promote the internal technology flow and thus affect the diversification 
 
 
of enterprise technology. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Technology Diversification 
The concept of technological diversification began with Nelson's (1959) analysis 
on the relationship between basic research and diversification strategies. Kodama (1986) 
introduced and defined the concept of technology diversification as the R&D activities 
of enterprises in related products other than leading products. Subsequently, scholars 
defined technological diversification from different perspectives. For example, Breschi 
et al. (2003)defined technology diversification across various multiple technical fields 
using technology patents applied by companies. In general, most scholars agree that the 
essence of enterprise technology diversification is based on maintaining and upgrading 
the company’s core technology, expanding its stock of technical knowledge to new 
technology fields, and finally developing new technological capabilities (Cantwell and 
Vertova, 2004). 
Different scholars study technology diversification from different perspectives. 
Barney (1986) took a resource-based view and proved that technological diversification 
can create scarce technical resources that contribute to the establishment of advantages. 
Brusoni et al. (2001) followed a knowledge-based perspective and explained that 
enterprises can gain a unique competitive advantage by constructing knowledge 
systems in multiple fields. This accomplishment is conducive to the accumulation of 
knowledge and the creation of new products through cross-integration of multiple fields 
and products. However, the existing research is primarily concerned with the results 
and effects of technological diversification (Garcia-Vega, 2006b, Chiu et al., 2008). 
Moreover, few studies have been conducted on the implementation mechanism of 
technology diversification and the factors that affect it. Granstrand et al. (1997) studied 
the effects of internal factors on corporate technology diversification but failed to focus 
on inventor cooperation network. 
2.2 Inventor Cooperation Network 
Numerous studies that focus on the measurement of cooperative patents (Swarna 
et al., 2009), the evolution of inventor cooperative networks (Fleming and Frenken, 
 
 
2007, Brenner et al., 2013), and Inventor Collaboration Network and Innovation 
Performance (Graf et al., 2011) have demonstrated the importance of inventor 
cooperation networks. Overall, current research on inventor collaboration networks 
focuses on team structure, team characteristics, leadership styles, and other factors 
(Earley and Mosakowski, 2000). However, few studies have addressed the effect of 
corporate in-house inventor cooperation networks on corporate technology 
diversification. Therefore, this study focuses on the mechanism of how corporate 
inventor cooperation network affects corporate technology diversification. 
The structure of social networks mainly includes relationship dimensions and 
structural dimensions (Granovetter, 1977). In addition, research results on the 
relationship dimensions in social networks show significant differences. For example, 
several scholars believe that strong relationships can deepen trust between actors in the 
network and promote the transmission of tacit knowledge (Rowley et al., 2000). 
However, strong relationships may also yield problems such as excessive cost and 
information redundancy (Uzzi, 1996). By contrast, Granovetter (1973) argued that 
weak relationships are conducive to the transmission of new knowledge, and weak 
relationships are less expensive to maintain than strong ones. Therefore, this study 
further explores the effect of network characteristics on corporate technology 
diversification from the structural dimension. The corporate inventor cooperation 
network is embodied by network location characteristics. Such characteristics can be 
divided into two types, namely, central and intermediary. These types are commonly 
measured using centrality and structural holes, respectively (Junker and Schreiber, 
2011). Centrality measures the degree of individual power in the network, while 
structural holes measure the connections between nodes in the network. These 
measurements are used because centrality and structural holes can fully reflect the 
positions of enterprises in social networks and their relationship to other enterprises 
(Xihong et al., 2010). This study focuses on the degree of centralization of the overall 
network based on the centrality for measuring the power distribution of the inventor's 
overall cooperative network (Kim and Shin, 2002). The mediator location of the 
inventor's cooperative network is measured using structural holes (Burt, 2003).  
 
 
2.3 Social capital theory 
Social capital theory posits that social networks are valuable, and social capital 
can generate information and control benefits (McFadyen and Cannella Jr, 2004). 
Social capital is conducive to helping enterprises achieve their business objectives. 
Furthermore, various social factors in modern markets have major or decisive effects 
on economic action (Granovetter, 1985). Human capital is one of the most important 
types of resources for enterprises (Barney, 1991). In in-house inventor cooperation 
network, the cooperation of R&D personnel leads to the exchange of key resources such 
as knowledge, skills, and information. Furthermore, the specific network location 
occupied by a specific enterprise reflects the company's ability to control resources, 
such as talent, information, and knowledge. Specific network location also shows the 
company’s network status and network rights (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In-house 
inventor cooperation network can promote the exchange of information, knowledge, 
and other resources among individuals; improve the combination efficiency of 
production factors and enable enterprises to control additional heterogeneous resources. 
The heterogeneous resources of enterprises can exhibit an important effect on the 
expansion of their technological bases and lead to sustainable competitive advantages 
of enterprises (Nelson, 1991). Therefore, drawing upon social capital theory, this study 
explores how in-house inventor cooperation network affects enterprises, enables them 
to obtain heterogeneous resources, and realizes enterprise technology diversification. 
 
3. Theoretical analysis and research hypothesis 
3.1 Inventor cooperation network and corporate technology diversification 
Corporate technology diversification is a product of internal production factors and 
resource combinations. The internal characteristics of an enterprise have an important 
effect on its technology diversification, particularly when the supply chain is complex 
(such as in electronic communication equipment manufacturing or the automotive 
industry) and the ability to accumulate technology related to fields outside a company’s 
unique capabilities is particularly important (Torrisi et al., 2004). Relevant research on 
social capital theory shows that social capital associated with relationships within a 
 
 
network is necessary for the development of an enterprise. Trust between employees 
can improve the quality of relationships within the participating enterprises and 
influence the cooperation structure (McFadyen and Cannella Jr, 2004). Internal social 
capital refers to the existence of trust and behavioral norms shared by employees and 
departments within the enterprise. In addition, internal social capital can enhance the 
combination efficiency of production factors (Leenders and Gabbay, 2013).  
3.1.1 Central location of inventor cooperation network and corporate 
technology diversification 
Social network is embodied by network location characteristics. Network location is 
divided into central location and intermediary location. Central location analysis is a 
quantitative analysis of power that measures the individual power in the network and 
thus the relative importance of each node (Junker and Schreiber, 2011). In corporate 
inventor cooperation network, the influence of the inventors on technology diversity 
differs given the different network locations of the inventors (Ibarra, 1993). In general, 
the superiority and authority of the network's central location enable the actors in such 
position to dominate a significant amount of information and numerous resources 
(Koka and Prescott, 2008). The current article focuses on the location of the overall 
network. Within the in-house inventor cooperation network, the central location 
describes “who” is the most important inventors by measuring its superiority, privilege, 
and attributes that represent the possibility of acquiring and controlling resources 
(Junker and Schreiber, 2011). The existence of a prominent central location means that 
the power in the network is mainly concentrated on few inventors. The opposite 
condition would be a uniform distribution of power throughout the network (Freeman, 
1978). Cooperation and communication among inventors within the enterprise exhibit 
a significant effect on team outputs. The inventor’s autonomy of innovation and passion 
for work considerably depend on his or her position and status in the network. Most 
members of the network lack interaction with prominent inventors in the central 
location, and the exchange of relationships is concentrated on extremely limited 
members. The inventors in the marginal positions are bound to display low morale, 
thereby affecting their commitment to the organization, particularly in R&D activities 
 
 
that require high synergy. Therefore, this study proposes Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1: The central location of in-house inventor cooperation network 
exhibits a significant negative effect on the degree of corporate technology 
diversification. 
3.1.2 Intermediary location of inventor cooperation network and corporate 
technology diversification 
If a network is divided into different components, each part can merely be contacted by 
one or several specific individuals, which forms an intermediary location (Burt, 2003). 
The intermediary location is equivalent to a bridge that can facilitate communication 
between two separate groups. Individuals at the intermediary location in the network 
occupy a position where they can grasp the flow of information and business 
opportunities and can obtain intermediary benefits including information and control 
gains (Cook and Emerson, 1978).  
Numerous intermediary locations in in-house inventor cooperation network indicate 
high information heterogeneity among inventors within the enterprise. Hoskisson et al. 
(1993) argued that the exchange of knowledge and information between actors in the 
network is conducive to the diversification of corporate technology. Inventors in 
intermediary positions can effectively integrate nonredundant information and 
knowledge acquired from different inventors by “information benefits” and “control 
interests” brought by their intermediary locations. Technological diversification arises 
from the creative combination of different resources. Therefore, this study proposes 
Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2: An intermediary location of in-house inventor cooperation network 
exhibits a significant positive effect on the degree of corporate technology 
diversification. 
3.2 Moderating effect of intellectual property protection  
Intellectual property optimizes resource allocation (Arrow et al., 1962) that affects 
the process of acquiring external resources (Sun et al., 2016). In order to 
utilize monopoly position to earn more rewards, inventors pay more attention to the 
incentive effect of intellectual property protection(Penin, 2005). However, most 
 
 
inventors are employed by some organization, and the majority of the bonus generated 
by the invention does not allocated to the inventor, which may result in 
their unwillingness to pay more efforts. So enterprises began to stimulate inventors by 
increasing inventors' salary and incentives. 
However, the number of proposed projects implemented is constrained by limited 
resources(Foss, 2003), and companies worry that too many incentives will generate 
redundant ideas that cannot be funded (Baumann and Stieglitz, 2014). Enterprises have 
to adopt different incentives according to patent quality and competitiveness(Giarratana 
et al., 2018). Therefore, inventors in enterprises, especially those with core technologies, 
are reluctant to share information for the reasons, like lack of willingness to share in 
pursuit of rewards (Lin et al., 2008), fear of losing ownership of knowledge or 
technology(Shaw and Edwards, 2005),etc. All these factors will affect the flow of 
knowledge and technology within enterprises. 
Considerable controversy concerning the optimal intellectual property strengths arises 
in different countries and regions (Branstetter et al., 2011).  Lerner (2002) noted that 
efforts to streamline and optimize legal procedures have unleashed additional litigation, 
which is not conducive to a virtuous cycle of technological innovation but harmful to 
social welfare. When faced with strict legal and regulatory constraints, companies in 
areas with high levels of intellectual property protection will exhibit limited ability to 
innovate by imitating the best companies in their vicinity (Glass and Saggi, 2002). This 
situation is not conducive to the expansion of the company's technology base. Although 
the legal and regulatory framework in China is consistent, differences are evident in the 
implementation of laws and policies in various places (Sun et al., 2016).Therefore, this 
study proposes the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: The strong level of intellectual property protection weakens the 
effect of the inventor cooperation network’s central location on corporate technology 
diversification. 
Hypothesis 3b: The strong level of intellectual property protection weakens the 




4. Research design 
4.1 Samples and data 
This paper used samples from manufacturing enterprises listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. To ensure the validity and reliability of conclusions, this 
study limits the study period from 2011 to 2015 given the completeness and availability 
of the data. Furthermore, we merely selected A-share listed companies as samples to 
avoid complications due to the differences among different types of stocks. A-shares 
are the predominant type of shares issued by publicly traded Chinese companies listed 
in China, denominated in RMB, and sold solely to domestic investors (Wang et al., 
2004). We also eliminated ST and *ST (“ST” represents special treatment stocks that 
have had two consecutive years of losses; “*ST” represents stocks with three 
consecutive years of losses and  faced with risks of being unlisted) shares given several 
deviations that were observed(Song et al., 2015). The independent and dependent 
variables of this paper study are based on patents, which is an approach consistent with 
previous scholars’ research methods (Cantwell and Vertova, 2004). Therefore, this 
study empirically explores the effect of in-house inventor cooperation network on 
technology diversification by using corporate patents and financial panel data from 
2011 to 2015 for 87 listed large-scale manufacturing companies. 
We selected the cooperation among patent inventors for patent application to express 
the cooperative relationship among them. The patent inventor cooperative network was 
generated by UCINET.6. (see Appendix, Section 1,2). 
 
 
4.2 Variable definition 
4.2.1 Corporate technology diversification 
This paper follows the methods described by Garcia-Vega (2006b) to measure 
enterprise technology diversification (TD). Patent data were extracted from the China 
National Intellectual Property Administration database (see www.sipo.gov.cn/zljs/) 
using a search algorithm based on a selection of IPC classes from OECD, which targets 




Subsequently, this paper uses the Herfindahl index to measure the degree of diversity 






                                                     （1） 
In (1), Pi represents the ratio of the number of patents owned by a certain enterprise 
in the technical field i to the total number of patents. A close TD value to 1 indicates 
that the company’s numerous patents are dispersed across a wide range of technical 
fields. This representation means that the level of technological diversification of 
enterprises is relatively high. By contrast, a close TD value to 0 indicates that the 
enterprises’ patent distribution is concentrated and their level of technological 
diversification is low. 
4.2.2 Inventor cooperation network 
The central location of the inventor's collaborative network is measured as centrality 
(Junker and Schreiber, 2011). Given that this paper regards in-house inventor 
cooperation network as an overall network by focusing on the overall power 
distribution of the network, it uses overall network degree centralization (NDC) 
indicators for measurement. The centralization index is a measurement of the overall 
power of the network. A high degree of centralization means that the power in the 
network is mainly concentrated on a few inventors, and the opposite means an even 
distribution of power throughout the network. The formula used in the calculation is as 
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where n is the number of nodes (the number of cooperation events among the inventors), 
CADi represents the absolute degree of i, CADmax represents the maximum value of the 
 
 
absolute degree in the network, CRDi represents the relative degree of i, and CRDmax 
represents the maximum value of the relative degree of centrality in the network. 
The inventor cooperative network mediation location is measured using the 
structural hole indicator, because structural holes are an indicator of the location of 
network intermediaries (Burt, 2003). Numerous methods for measuring the Structure 
Hole Degree (SH), including effective scale, efficiency, constraint coefficient, and 
grade are available (Burt, 1992). In this paper, the widely used “constraint index” 
measures the richness of the structural hole. High constraint degree yields few structural 
holes in the network. The quantitative relationship between the degree of constraint and 
the structural hole is as follows: assuming that the maximum degree of constraint is 1, 
then the difference between 1 and the constraint is often used to measure the richness 
of the structural hole (Bell and Zaheer, 2007). The formulas used in the calculation of 
structural holes in this paper are shown in equations (4), (5), and (6). 
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Cij = (pij + ∑ piqpqjq )
2                                                 （6） 
In these equations, i, j, and q represent three different inventors. If two inventors i 
and j are connected with q, then q acts as a bridge between i and j. Pij, Piq, and Pqj 
represent the proportion of direct contact in all indirect connections between i and j, i 
and q, and q and i, respectively. Cij represents the degree of dependence of i on j, and 
Ci represents the degree of dependence of i on all other nodes. 
4.2.3 Intellectual property protection 
The GP index proposed by Park and Ginarte (1996) is the most widely used method to 
measure the intensity of intellectual property protection. In 2005, Park updated and 
revised the substitute variables of the GP index based on actual conditions (Park, 2005). 
However, the GP index remains an evaluation of whether a country has sound 
intellectual property protection laws without the consideration of the actual effects of 
implementing the laws. Sun et al. (2016) mentioned that although the legal and 
 
 
regulatory framework in China is uniform, differences in the interpretation and 
enforcement of local laws and policies are evident. Therefore, this study introduces the 
intellectual property enforcement intensity index based on the GP index to 
comprehensively evaluate the Intellectual property protection level (see Appendix, 
Section 3). 
4.2.4 Control variables 
By drawing on recent literature on corporate technology diversification (Said et al., 
2003), this study selects the natural logarithm of the total number of employees at the 
end of the year to control the impact of firm size (Ahuja, 2000). The company’s length 
of establishment indicates the number of technology and resources it accumulates. In 
addition, this paper uses age of establishment (AGE) as one control variable (Huergo 
and Jaumandreu, 2004). Many companies also use the debt of innovation to obtain the 
excess return of profits after innovation success. The form acquires innovation input; 
hence, the asset–liability ratio (DAR) also affects the technological innovation of the 
enterprise to a certain extent. Given that the sample companies in this study are from 
different manufacturing sectors and companies in various industries exhibit specific 
industry characteristics, this study sets five industry dummy variables to control 
industry differences. Table 1 presents the definitions used in this study. 
 
 
5. Results and analysis 
5.1. Descriptive statistics analysis 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the characteristics of the major variables. 
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients Tables 2 and 3 present the data, such 
as the mean, standard deviation, and correlation. These data are calculated based on 
nonstandardized variables. In the subsequent hypothesis test, normalized data are used 
as independent variables and mediation variables. Data normalization can reduce the 
problem of multicollinearity and increase the degree of interpretation of product terms 
(Aiken et al., 1991). Table 3 shows that the correlation coefficient between the degree 
centralization and the structural hole of the inventor cooperation network are below the 
 
 
critical value 0.6, as well as the independent and the adjustment variables. A value larger 
than this threshold indicates that multicollinearity is likely to exist. 
 
 
We also computed the VIFs (Table 4) and found that most of the values are close 
to 1 and lower than the conservative threshold of 5 (Neter et al., 1996). Therefore, no 
serious multicollinearity exists. 
 
5.2. Regression analysis 
We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis to test the moderating effect. Table 5 
reports the results. In terms of the control variables, the results reach a significant level 
(F=2.93, p<0.05). Model 1 only contains the baseline model of the control variables. 
Moreover, the result of the Hausman test shows that a fixed effect model is suitable. We 
subsequently added the independent variables to test the linear relationship between 
inventor cooperation network and corporate technology diversification. Model 2 adds 
two main effects of the inventor’s collaborative network center location and mediation 
location. Model 3 adds a moderating variable. Model 4 provides the product term of the 
independent and mediator variables. 
 
5.3 Hypothetical test 
In Table 5, Model 2 provides strong support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. In 
Model 1, the influence of the central location of the inventor cooperative network on 
corporate technology diversification is negative and highly significant (β=-0.374, 
P<0.001). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is established. The influence of the intermediary 
location of the inventor cooperative network on corporate technology diversification is 
positive and highly significant (β=0.263, P＜0.001), thereby indicating that Hypothesis 
2 is accepted. The results of Model 4 reveal that the coefficient of the interaction term 
between central location and intellectual property protection intensity is positive but 
not significant. (β=0.033, P>0.1). Therefore, Hypothesis 3a is not supported. The 
 
 
coefficient of the interaction term between intermediary location and intellectual 
property protection intensity is positive and significant. (β=-0.145, P<0.001), thereby 
accepting Hypothesis 3b. 
To explicitly express how the moderating effect of intellectual property protection 
works, this paper uses the mean values of the regulatory variables as a benchmark. 
Samples with values greater than or equal to the mean are classified as high, whereas 
samples with values smaller than the mean are classified as low. Thus, a regression 
adjustment effect map is created (see Figure 1). Figure 1 compares the relationship 
between the intermediary location of the cooperative network and corporate technology 
diversification at different intellectual property protection levels.  
Previous literature has shown that entropy index method is another commonly used 
method to measure technical diversity(Garcia-Vega, 2006a, Hidalgo and Hausmann, 
2009). To prove the validity of the study, we added the robustness test. We found that 
the results of the two methods were consistent (see Appendix, Section 4). 
 
6. Discussion 
Central location and corporate technology diversification: within the in-house inventor 
cooperation network, a prominent central location, indicates relative concentration of 
power on the hands of several people. Two negative effects are made on the 
diversification of enterprise technology. First, a small number of people control the 
resources and information, but their own innovation and mobility are limited. A 
substantial number of resources are collected around them, but these resources can 
merely be used in an extremely limited manner and consequently produce considerable 
waste. Second, the morale of the majority of members at the edge of power is low owing 
to the concentration of power, thereby reducing their organizational commitment and 
work enthusiasm. Substantial results that lack good communication and cooperation 
among internal members can hardly be achieved because technological diversification 
is a highly collaborative and complex process.  
Intermediary location and corporate technology diversity: the substantial number 
of intermediary locations presented in an in-house inventor cooperation network 
 
 
indicate qualitative information possessed by actors in the intermediary location 
contributes to diversity. Furthermore, other inventors are willing to work with inventors 
at intermediary locations to further recognize and exploit new opportunities. An 
increase in intermediary location within the enterprise means the accruement of 
heterogeneous knowledge and information. The inventors occupying other locations 
actively cooperate with inventors who occupy the intermediary. This condition is also 
conducive to generating new technology and promoting the degree of corporate 
technology diversification.  
Moderating effect of intellectual property protection: compared with areas with 
weak degree of intellectual property protection, the intermediary location of inventor’s 
cooperative network in areas with strong degree has a weaker impact on corporate 
technology diversification, which shows that stringent intellectual property protection 
will result in resistance to the improvement of corporate technology diversification. 
Different regions should adopt intellectual property protection policies congruent to the 
realistic development level of enterprises. Results also show that enterprises in different 
regions should continually adjust their business strategies to reflect changes in the 
institutional environment. In addition, intellectual property protection lacks a 
moderating effect on central location and corporate technology diversification, which 
is caused byseveral factors in the distribution of individual rights in the inventors’ 
cooperative network, such as corporate organizational culture, internal resource input, 
and technical learning. This analysis is consistent with the work of previous scholars 
(Osterloff, 2003). 
7. Conclusions and implications 
Several theoretical conclusions are drawn in this study. (1) First, this paper constructs 
an analytical framework on the relationship between in-house inventor cooperation 
networks and corporate technology diversification. Moreover, this study introduces the 
method of social network analysis into the process of technology diversification 
research. This paper also adopts the perspective of social capital theory and explores its 
relationship with technology diversification by focusing on several key factors that 
affect corporate technology diversification. Most existing research is concerned with 
 
 
the results of diversification of enterprise technology, and research on the factors that 
lead to such diversification is relatively sparse. These instances happen because the 
promotion of enterprise technology diversification strategy must be realized through 
enterprise employees, particularly inventors. Second, this study further examines the 
moderating effect of intellectual property protection on inventor cooperation networks 
and corporate technology diversification and clarifies the boundary conditions of the 
inventor cooperation network’s effects on corporate technology diversification. Third, 
based on the actual protection of intellectual property rights in China, this study 
constructs an intellectual property protection intensity index. In previous studies, the 
intensity of patent protection is used to characterize the intensity of intellectual property 
protection (Park, 2005). Intellectual property mainly includes patents, trademarks, and 
copyrights (Cornish et al., 2003). Therefore, this paper adds the contents of trademark 
protection and copyright protection. Furthermore, previous studies have merely 
concentrated on the strength of intellectual property legislation. However, the 
effectiveness of law enforcement should be taken into  consideration (Lesser, 2005).  
Several management implications are also enumerated. First, companies must 
focus on the “democracy” within the organization. In particular, companies should 
attempt to achieve a relatively even distribution of power to break the monopoly of 
cooperative networks and to amplify the voice to internal enterprises inventors with 
innovation and execution capabilities. Second, all inventors in the enterprise should 
exert their enthusiasm and initiative for innovation, while each intermediary node is a 
source of innovation. Converging these different sources provides continuous 
locomotive for corporate technology diversification. Therefore, enterprises should pay 
attention to structuring a reasonable inventor cooperation network and increasing the 
number of network structural holes. Third, enterprises should focus on the institutional 
environment, including intellectual property protection, and adjust their business 
policies in a timely manner. 
Several limitations are recognized in the current study. First, we employed a 
merely limited panel dataset covering 2011 to 2015 and included 87 sample firms in the 
manufacturing industry owing to our choice of data and samples. Future study should 
 
 
consider data screening. Furthermore, the range of sample companies should be 
enlarged to enhance the representativeness of results. Second, patent data are used to 
measure corporate technology diversification. Although patent data are easily 
accessible and show good continuity, they cannot fully reflect the deep motivation of 
technology diversification. Therefore, our follow-up study will employ a broader 
context than the present and adopt other index to reflect corporate technology 
diversification. Third, in view of the complex relationship between in-house inventor 
cooperation networks and technology diversification, the possible non-linear 



































AHUJA, G. J. A. S. Q. 2000. Collaboration networks, structural holes, and 
innovation: A longitudinal study. 45, 425-455. 
AIKEN, L. S., WEST, S. G. & RENO, R. R. 1991. Multiple regression: 
Testing and interpreting interactions, Sage. 
ARROW, K., NELSON, R. J. E. W. & INVENTION, T. A. O. R. F. 1962. 
The rate and direction of inventive activity. 609. 
BARNEY, J. B. J. A. O. M. R. 1986. Types of competition and the theory 
of strategy: Toward an integrative framework. 11, 791-800. 
BARNEY, J. J. J. O. M. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive 
advantage. 17, 99-120. 
BAUMANN, O. & STIEGLITZ, N. 2014. Rewarding value‐creating ideas 
in organizations: The power of low‐powered incentives. Strategic Management 
Journal, 35, 358-375. 
BELL, G. G. & ZAHEER, A. J. O. S. 2007. Geography, networks, and 
knowledge flow. 18, 955-972. 
BRANSTETTER, L., FISMAN, R., FOLEY, C. F. & SAGGI, K. J. J. O. I. 
E. 2011. Does intellectual property rights reform spur industrial development? 
83, 27-36. 
BRENNER, T., CANTNER, U. & GRAF, H. J. R. S. 2013. Introduction: 
Structure and dynamics of innovation networks. 47, 647-650. 
BRESCHI, S., LISSONI, F. & MALERBA, F. 2003. Knowledge-
relatedness in firm technological diversification. Research policy, 32, 69-87. 
BROWN, S. L. & EISENHARDT, K. M. J. A. S. Q. 1997. The art of 
continuous change: Linking complexity theory and time-paced evolution in 
relentlessly shifting organizations. 1-34. 
BRUSONI, S., PRENCIPE, A. & PAVITT, K. J. A. S. Q. 2001. Knowledge 
specialization, organizational coupling, and the boundaries of the firm: why do 
firms know more than they make? 46, 597-621. 
BURT, M. J. J. O. P. C. M. 1992. The justification for applying the 
effective-mass approximation to microstructures. 4, 6651. 
BURT, R. S. J. N. I. T. K. E. 2003. The social structure of competition. 13-
56. 
CANTWELL, J. & VERTOVA, G. J. R. P. 2004. Historical evolution of 
technological diversification. 33, 511-529. 
CHEN, Y.-S., CHEN, B.-Y. J. T. F. & CHANGE, S. 2011. Utilizing patent 
analysis to explore the cooperative competition relationship of the two LED 
companies: Nichia and Osram. 78, 294-302. 
CHIU, Y.-C., LAI, H.-C., LEE, T.-Y., LIAW, Y.-C. J. T. F. & CHANGE, S. 
 
 
2008. Technological diversification, complementary assets, and performance. 
75, 875-892. 
CHU, A. C., COZZI, G. & GALLI, S. 2014. Stage-dependent intellectual 
property rights. Journal of Development Economics, 106, 239-249. 
COOK, K. S. & EMERSON, R. M. J. A. S. R. 1978. Power, equity and 
commitment in exchange networks. 721-739. 
CORNISH, W., LLEWELYN, D. & APLIN, T. 2003. Intellectual Property: 
Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (6 th, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
EARLEY, C. P. & MOSAKOWSKI, E. J. A. O. M. J. 2000. Creating hybrid 
team cultures: An empirical test of transnational team functioning. 43, 26-49. 
FLEMING, L. & FRENKEN, K. J. A. I. C. S. 2007. The evolution of 
inventor networks in the Silicon Valley and Boston regions. 10, 53-71. 
FOSS, N. J. 2003. Selective intervention and internal hybrids: Interpreting 
and learning from the rise and decline of the Oticon spaghetti organization. 
Organization Science, 14, 331-349. 
FREEMAN, L. C. J. S. N. 1978. Centrality in social networks conceptual 
clarification. 1, 215-239. 
GAMBARDELLA, A. & TORRISI, S. J. R. P. 1998. Does technological 
convergence imply convergence in markets? Evidence from the electronics 
industry. 27, 445-463. 
GARCIA-VEGA, M. 2006a. Does technological diversification promote 
innovation?: An empirical analysis for European firms. Research policy, 35, 
230-246. 
GARCIA-VEGA, M. J. R. P. 2006b. Does technological diversification 
promote innovation?: An empirical analysis for European firms. 35, 230-246. 
GEMBA, K. & KODAMA, F. 2001. Diversification dynamics of the 
Japanese industry. Research Policy, 30, 1165-1184. 
GIARRATANA, M. S., MARIANI, M. & WELLER, I. 2018. Rewards for 
patents and inventor behaviors in industrial research and development. Academy 
of Management Journal, 61, 264-292. 
GLASS, A. J. & SAGGI, K. J. J. O. I. E. 2002. Intellectual property rights 
and foreign direct investment. 56, 387-410. 
GRAF, H., KRüGER, J. J. J. I. & INNOVATION 2011. The performance 
of gatekeepers in innovator networks. 18, 69-88. 
GRANOVETTER, M. J. A. J. O. S. 1985. Economic action and social 
structure: The problem of embeddedness. 91, 481-510. 
GRANOVETTER, M. J. A. J. S. 1973. M. Granovetter, Am. J. Sociol. 78, 
1360 (1973). 78, 1360. 
GRANOVETTER, M. S. 1977. The strength of weak ties. Social networks. 
Elsevier. 
GRANSTRAND, O., PATEL, P. & PAVITT, K. J. C. M. R. 1997. Multi-
technology corporations: why they have “distributed” rather than “distinctive 
core” competencies. 39, 8-25. 
 
 
HASAN, I., WACHTEL, P., ZHOU, M. J. J. O. B. & FINANCE 2009. 
Institutional development, financial deepening and economic growth: Evidence 
from China. 33, 157-170. 
HENDERSON, R. & CLARK, K. B. J. A. S. Q. 1990. Architectural 
innovation: The reconfiguration of existing product technologies and the failure 
of established firms. 
HIDALGO, C. & HAUSMANN, R. 2009. The building blocks of 
economic complexity. proceedings of the national academy of sciences. 2009; 
106 (26): 10570–10575. 
HOSKISSON, R. E., HILL, C. W. & KIM, H. J. J. O. M. 1993. The 
multidivisional structure: organizational fossil or source of value? 19, 269-298. 
HOU, J. & MOHNEN, P. 2013. Complementarity between in-house R&D 
and technology purchasing: evidence from Chinese manufacturing firms. 
Oxford Development Studies, 41, 343-371. 
HUERGO, E. & JAUMANDREU, J. J. I. J. O. I. O. 2004. Firms' age, 
process innovation and productivity growth. 22, 541-559. 
IBARRA, H. J. A. O. M. J. 1993. Network centrality, power, and 
innovation involvement: Determinants of technical and administrative roles. 36, 
471-501. 
JUNKER, B. H. & SCHREIBER, F. 2011. Analysis of biological networks, 
John Wiley & Sons. 
KIM, S. & SHIN, E.-H. J. S. F. 2002. A longitudinal analysis of 
globalization and regionalization in international trade: A social network 
approach. 81, 445-468. 
KIM, Y. K., LEE, K., PARK, W. G. & CHOO, K. 2012. Appropriate 
intellectual property protection and economic growth in countries at different 
levels of development. Research policy, 41, 358-375. 
KOKA, B. R. & PRESCOTT, J. E. J. S. M. J. 2008. Designing alliance 
networks: the influence of network position, environmental change, and 
strategy on firm performance. 29, 639-661. 
LEENDERS, R. T. A. & GABBAY, S. M. 2013. Corporate social capital 
and liability, Springer Science & Business Media. 
LERNER, J. J. A. E. R. 2002. 150 years of patent protection. 92, 221-225. 
LESSER, W. 2005. Intellectual property rights in a changing political 
environment: perspectives on the types and administration of protection. 
LIN, C., TAN, B. & CHANG, S. 2008. An exploratory model of 
knowledge flow barriers within healthcare organizations. Information & 
Management, 45, 331-339. 
LONG, C. X. & WANG, J. 2018. China’s patent promotion policies and its 
quality implications. Science and Public Policy, 46, 91-104. 
MCFADYEN, M. A. & CANNELLA JR, A. A. J. A. O. M. J. 2004. Social 
capital and knowledge creation: Diminishing returns of the number and strength 
of exchange relationships. 47, 735-746. 
NAHAPIET, J. & GHOSHAL, S. Social capital, intellectual capital and the 
 
 
creation of value in firms.  Academy of Management Proceedings, 1997. 
Academy of Management Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510, 35-39. 
NELSON, R. R. J. S. M. J. 1991. Why do firms differ, and how does it 
matter? 12, 61-74. 
NETER, J., KUTNER, M. H., NACHTSHEIM, C. J. & WASSERMAN, 
W. 1996. Applied linear statistical models, Irwin Chicago. 
OSTERLOFF, M. 2003. Technology-based product market entries: 
managerial resources and decision-making process, Helsinki University of 
Technology. 
PANDA, S. & SHARMA, R. 2019. Impact of patent rights on innovation: 
A meta‐analysis. Journal of Public Affairs, e2000. 
PARK 2005. Do intellectual property rights stimulate R&D and 
productivity growth? Evidence from cross-national and manufacturing 
industries data. 9, 1-9. 
PARK, W. G. & GINARTE, J. C. J. S. C. 1996. Intellectual property rights 
in a north-south economic context. 17, 379-387. 
PENIN, J. 2005. Patents versus ex post rewards: A new look. Research 
Policy, 34, 641-656. 
ROWLEY, T., BEHRENS, D. & KRACKHARDT, D. J. S. M. J. 2000. 
Redundant governance structures: An analysis of structural and relational 
embeddedness in the steel and semiconductor industries. 21, 369-386. 
SAID, A. A., HASSABELNABY, H. R. & WIER, B. J. J. O. M. A. R. 2003. 
An empirical investigation of the performance consequences of nonfinancial 
measures. 15, 193-223. 
SHAW, D. & EDWARDS, J. S. 2005. Building user commitment to 
implementing a knowledge management strategy. Information & Management, 
42, 977-988. 
SONG, M., AI, H. & LI, X. 2015. Political connections, financing 
constraints, and the optimization of innovation efficiency among China's private 
enterprises. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 92, 290-299. 
SUN, P., HU, H. W. & HILLMAN, A. J. J. A. O. M. J. 2016. The dark side 
of board political capital: Enabling blockholder rent appropriation. 59, 1801-
1822. 
SUZUKI, J. & KODAMA, F. J. R. P. 2004. Technological diversity of 
persistent innovators in Japan: Two case studies of large Japanese firms. 33, 
531-549. 
SWARNA, C., RAMACHANDRAN, R., DESAI, N., SEBASTIAN, A., 
VENUGOPALAN, T. & SAMAYAMANTRY, R. 2009. Flexible event 
correlation aggregation tool. Google Patents. 
SWEET, C. M. & MAGGIO, D. S. E. 2015. Do stronger intellectual 
property rights increase innovation? World Development, 66, 665-677. 
TAKAGI, S., TOYAMA, R. J. I. J. O. K. & LEARNING 2009. Generation 




TORRISI, S., GRANSTRAND, O. J. T. E. & DIVERSIFICATION, M. O. 
T. 2004. Technological and business diversification. 34, 21. 
UZZI, B. J. A. S. R. 1996. The sources and consequences of embeddedness 
for the economic performance of organizations: The network effect. 674-698. 
WANG, X., XU, L. C. & ZHU, T. 2004. State‐owned enterprises going 
public The case of China. Economics of transition, 12, 467-487. 
WASSERMAN, S. & FAUST, K. 1994. Social network analysis: Methods 
and applications, Cambridge university press. 
XIHONG, Q., YONGFU, Y. & WANLI, X. J. M. W. 2010. Network 
position Absorptive capacity and Innovation Performance-An interactive effect 
model. 5, 118-129. 
 
